China's Waste‑to‑Energy Surge: Incinerator Boom, Economics & Health

In 2019, a BBC story highlighted the Jiangcungou landfill in Xi'an, China, which had reached capacity 25 years ahead of schedule. At that time, China had approximately 400 incineration and waste-to-energy plants, processing about 50% of the country's municipal solid waste through incineration. By 2025, this number dramatically increased to over 1,137 incineration plants, with over 80% of Chinese municipal solid waste being incinerated. The country now boasts about 1.2 million tons of daily incineration capacity, exceeding its 700,000 tons of daily waste collection capacity, leading to mothballed capacity and the excavation of old landfills. This rapid expansion, with 700 incinerator plants built in just six years, marks an unprecedented incinerator boom in human history.

Why We Burn Waste

Municipal solid waste is incinerated for several key reasons:

• Volume Reduction: Incineration reduces waste volume by 70-75%, leaving behind ash that is 25-30% of its original size. This significantly conserves landfill space, a crucial benefit for densely populated megacities in Asia like Seoul, which has banned direct landfilling of solid waste without prior incineration due to dwindling space.
• Landfill Stability and Cleanliness: Burning waste helps stabilize and clean landfills by removing odors and organic trash. Organic waste can produce explosive gases and cause land shifts, as seen in the December 2015 Shenzhen incident where a construction waste landslide killed at least 73 people.
• Environmental Benefits: While incineration contributes some greenhouse gases, it can prevent larger emissions of methane and carbon dioxide that result from waste decomposition in landfills.
• Waste-to-Energy (WtE): Incineration can convert waste into a renewable energy source.

Waste-to-Energy Systems

Waste-to-energy systems function similarly to other thermal power stations, burning waste to generate steam that drives a turbine.

Moving Grate Technology

The most common WtE technology is the "moving grate." In this system:

1. Waste Feed: Waste fuel is placed on a downward-sloping moving grate, which slowly transports and mixes the material.
2. Drying: Hot air from above and fire from below dry the waste, removing water content that can reduce heating efficiency. Pre-shredding is not always necessary for moving grates.
3. Combustion: The waste enters a combustion chamber, where it remains for at least 2 seconds at temperatures between 850 and 1,100 degrees Celsius. Higher temperatures are used for potentially hazardous materials like chlorine-containing plastics.
4. Ash and Flue Gas: Remaining ash drops through a chute. Flue gas, carrying energy, boils water in a boiler to produce steam.
5. Power Generation: Steam drives a turbine before condensing back into liquid.
6. Flue Gas Post-Processing: The flue gas undergoes further treatment.

The "Toy Story 3" incinerator, depicted as a simple open pit, would be highly polluting compared to a real moving grate system.

Other WtE Technologies

Another alternative is the Circulating Fluidized Bed, which feeds waste into a chamber of hot fluidized sand and tends to be more efficient.

Efficiency Considerations

WtE plants are generally less efficient than modern fossil fuel-fired thermal plants, typically operating at 30% or lower efficiency compared to 40% or more. This is because the steam generated is not as hot (around 400 degrees Celsius vs. 600 degrees Celsius), primarily due to the corrosive nature of waste-derived flue gases containing chlorine from plastics.

China's Trash Boom

China's government turned to incineration and WtE not primarily for power generation, but to manage an overwhelming amount of trash.

• Historical Context: In 1981, China collected about 26 million tons of municipal solid waste. The United States, with a quarter of China's population, generated six times that amount. Before its economic opening, China's population was poorer and produced less waste, mostly organic.
• Rapid Growth and Urbanization: China's rapid development and urbanization drastically increased both the quantity and composition of waste. Waste generation grew at 8-10% annually, a rate unprecedented globally.
• Global Leader in Waste: By 2004, Mainland China surpassed the United States as the world's largest generator of municipal solid waste. By 2014, this figure reached 178 million tons, nearly seven times the 1981 level.
• Changing Waste Composition: While organic material remains significant, there's now more plastic, paper, and metal. Informal recycling exists, but low material prices make it unprofitable.
• Future Projections: The World Bank projected in 2018 that by 2030, China would generate twice as much trash as the US, raising concerns about disposal.

The Landfill Crisis

Traditionally, landfills were the primary disposal method.

• Early Landfills: Early landfills used cement liners, but these often leaked toxic chemicals into groundwater. Modern landfills with high-density polyethylene liners only emerged in the 1990s.
• Challenges of Official Landfills: City governments struggled to establish enough official landfills. Proper landfill construction is a multi-year project involving environmental surveys, groundwater risk assessments, access roads, liners, waste gas infrastructure, and monitoring equipment.
• Rise of Illegal Dumps: The inability of official landfills to keep pace led to widespread illegal landfills and open-air dumps. This resulted in over 200 Chinese cities being "besieged by garbage," posing significant safety hazards.
• Incineration as a Solution: Facing similar land scarcity issues, megacities like Tokyo, Seoul, and Singapore had already adopted incinerators as a technological solution, a path China subsequently followed.

The Incinerator Era Begins

• First Modern Incinerator: Mainland China's first modern incinerator was built in Shenzhen in 1985, with a capacity of 500 tons per day. The technology was provided by Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, which had licensed it from Germany's MARTIN in the 1970s.
• Slow Adoption: In the 2000s, WtE plants were not widely adopted. In 2002, only 3.7% of China's collected waste was incinerated, with over 85% still being landfilled.
• Challenges to Incineration:
  • Organic Waste: Chinese urban households produce a high proportion of organic trash (60-80% water), which dampens heating value during incineration.
  • High Capital Costs: WtE plants have significantly higher capital costs ($66,000 to $120,000 per ton of daily capacity, sometimes up to $365,000 in developed countries) compared to landfills ($5,000 to $20,000 per daily ton). This made landfills 5-10 times cheaper, even more so for illegal ones.

"Beijing Besieged by Waste"

Early on, a debate raged about whether incineration merely treated symptoms without addressing the root cause of waste generation. Critics argued that without proper recycling or incentives for reduction, incineration simply transferred pollution to the air, raising health concerns.

The 2011 documentary "Beijing Besieged by Waste" by Wang Jiuliang brought this issue to public attention. Wang mapped over 450 illegal landfills and dumps around Beijing, exposing the harsh lives of trash pickers and showing disturbing footage of animals consuming plastic bags. The film's stark portrayal generated significant public sentiment, compelling Chinese authorities to act.

Waste Becomes an Asset

The 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) acknowledged that rapid urbanization had outpaced waste processing capacity.

• 2012 Tariff Policy: In April 2012, a new tariff policy made WtE plants attractive investments. The government deemed each ton of solid waste to provide about 280 kilowatt-hours of power and pledged to pay WtE plants 0.65 RMB for each of these kilowatt-hours. This subsidy, funded by local grid companies with national support, made the business profitable.
• Revenue Streams:
  • Subsidies: Plant owner-operators could earn approximately 182 RMB per ton from subsidies. Any power generated above 280 kWh per ton was paid at a lower coal-fired benchmark rate (0.25 to 0.45 RMB per kWh).
  • Waste Disposal Fees: The second largest revenue source was city waste disposal service fees, typically 60 to 160 RMB per ton, determined by bid.
  • Additional Revenue: Plants could also earn from selling heat, disposing of industrial sludge, selling power to data centers, or selling leftover metal slag.
• Profitability: The average WtE plant generated 250-350 RMB per ton of waste. With estimated costs around 200 RMB per ton, gross margins ranged from 25-75%. A VAT refund for several years further boosted after-tax cash flow.
• Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Model: Most plants were built using the BOT model. Companies secured long-term concessions from local governments, raised funds (often through bonds), built the plants, operated them for 20-30 years to earn profits, and then transferred ownership to the government.
• Industry Growth: The government subsidy, accounting for over half of total revenue, made the industry viable. This led to the emergence of major companies like China Everbright, Chongqing Sanfeng, Shanghai Environment Protection Group, and Zheneng Jinjiang Environment, with over 20 publicly listed companies in the sector.

Health Concerns

Incinerators face criticism due to potential health side-effects, with many questions remaining unresolved.

• Particle Emissions: Short and long-term exposure to airborne particles can cause chronic conditions like bronchitis, respiratory diseases, and cardiovascular issues, including lung cancer. Environmentally, particles contribute to haze and smog and harm plants and animals. While afterburner zones and filters reduce larger particles, concerns persist about "nano-particles" that can enter the lungs, though their health impact is still debated.
• Flue Gas Composition: Flue gas can contain hydrochloric acid, sulfur dioxide, sulfur trioxide, nitric oxide, and heavy metals like copper, depending on waste composition.
• Dioxins and Furans: These "super-toxins" are chlorinated hydrocarbons produced when burning plastics. They are resistant to degradation, accumulate in the food chain, and are linked to reproductive problems, weakened immune systems, and potential cancers. Modern incinerators aim to reduce dioxin levels through high heat (at least 2 seconds at over 1,000 degrees Celsius), catalysts, and filters, but concerns remain about monitoring reliability and the presence of dioxins in fly ash, as well as other byproducts like mercury and sulfur dioxide. Some argue that incinerators are inherently problematic.

NIMBY Concerns

"Not In My Backyard" (NIMBY) sentiment is a significant challenge to building incinerators.

• Seoul Example: Seoul's ban on direct landfilling highlights its own incinerator capacity shortage, as residents oppose new facilities. A 2022 plan for a new incinerator in Mapo was canceled after legal challenges, and a "modernization" project in Gangnam faces similar impasses.
• Reasons for Opposition: Beyond health and environmental risks, people worry about operational risks and the potential for massive damage from accidents. For example, a methane explosion at the Shanghai Jiangqiao Municipal Solid Waste Incineration Plant in December 2013 reportedly killed three people.

The Hangzhou Plant Incident

The most notable NIMBY incident occurred in Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, concerning the Jiufeng Plant.

• Context: In late 2014, Hangzhou, with 8.9 million people and a 75% urbanization rate, produced 9,055 tons of municipal solid waste daily, growing at 10% annually. Existing WtE plants handled 4,600 tons per day, and the main landfill was nearing capacity.
• New Plant Proposal: In April 2014, the local government announced a new 3,000-ton-per-day plant in the Yuhang district.
• Public Outcry: Hangzhou, a historic city and home to major tech companies and Longjing tea cultivation, has a wealthy population sensitive to environmental impact. The proposed plant, located 20 miles southwest of downtown, sparked widespread concern. 20,000 residents signed a petition.
• Protests and Violence: After a brief media session and the delivery of geological equipment, rumors spread, leading to daily protests. In May 2014, tens of thousands clashed with police, blocking a major highway and causing property damage. State media reported 39 injuries but no deaths, a figure widely doubted.
• Government Response: The local government suspended the project, pledging a legal decision-making process.
• "Decide-Announce-Defend" Failure: The incident exemplified the "Decide-Announce-Defend" approach, where a small group made a technocratic decision without transparency or public involvement, leading to public anger and backlash.

Addressing NIMBYism

While NIMBY feelings cannot be eliminated, they can be managed through early engagement and public education.

• Hangzhou's Reboot: After the 2014 incident, the Hangzhou government did not abandon the plant but rebooted the process.
  • Operator Change: The inexperienced state-owned startup operator was replaced by Everbright, a larger, more experienced company.
  • Transparency and Public Participation: A thorough Environmental Impact Analysis was conducted with public and central government institute participation, and documents were made available online.
  • Community Engagement: Government staff interviewed over 25,000 people, collecting 500 suggestions. A special disposal fee funded environmental initiatives, and local residents were hired as supervisors.
  • Financial Support: The Yuhang District promised $360 million for tourism and infrastructure.
  • Expert Engagement: Local hearings were held where Everbright experts answered questions. 5,000 residents were bused to other Everbright facilities to see operations and automatic monitoring equipment.
• Restart and Completion: Construction restarted in April 2015, and the plant became operational in late November 2017. This process established a playbook for handling NIMBY sentiments, emphasizing community engagement, careful site selection, automatic monitoring, and transparent EIA procedures. While some opposition persists, construction can now proceed.

The Incinerator Boom Continues

• Government Targets: The Chinese central government aimed for 591,000 daily tons of capacity by 2020. In December 2017, provincial governments were ordered to finalize site selections by 2018 to meet this deadline, as plants take 15-24 months to build.
• Rapid Expansion: Between 2013 and 2017, China added 41 new WtE plants annually, totaling 360 by the end of 2017. By mid-2019, over 400 projects were in progress.
• 2020 Achievements: By 2020, China had 462 operational WtE plants, reaching 580,000 tons per day, essentially meeting the target.
• New Targets and Subsidy Changes: Progress was uneven, with East China meeting targets while West and Central China lagged. The central government raised the target to 800,000 tons per day, focusing on rural areas.
  • Subsidy Reduction: Plants started after January 2021 no longer receive the 0.65 RMB per kWh subsidy. Existing subsidies will sunset after 82,500 hours, and VAT refunds were partially lowered.
  • Shift in Focus: This aimed to reduce reliance on power generation (which is less economical than solar/wind) and encourage plants to generate revenue from city waste disposal fees and improve efficiency.
• Current Status: All projects were slated for completion by 2023. By the end of 2024, China had 1,137 WtE plants.
• Regional Imbalance and Underutilization: 60% of total incineration capacity is concentrated in five provinces: Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shandong, and Fujian. Between 2023 and 2025, the average capacity utilization rate was around 60%, with some plants at over 80% and others as low as 24%. Approximately 16% of projects have utilization rates below 50%, leading to significant financial losses due to high fixed costs and prompting the excavation of older landfills.
• Future Growth and Diversification: Post-2022, growth will slow. Businesses must find new revenue streams beyond subsidies, such as increasing city waste disposal fees, expanding into rural areas, building plants abroad (e.g., Indonesia), and developing new business lines like smelting.

Conclusion

While some view the reduction of visible waste as a positive environmental outcome, the long-term sustainability of sending waste into the air remains questionable. However, the Chinese government's ability to rapidly spur private industrial development and construct these often unpopular facilities in a short timeframe is a notable achievement, offering lessons in large-scale infrastructure development.