Global Location Data Trade Exposes Privacy, Security Risks

Name: Dangerous apps - In the web of data brokers | DW Documentary
Uploaded: 2026-04-18T16:00:59+00:00
Duration: 51 min 56 s
Channel: DW Documentary
Description: Summary and key takeaways on Global Location Data Trade Exposes Privacy, Security Risks, covering The global market for precise smartphone location data

DW Documentary

Apr 18, 2026

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51 min video

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2 min read

YouTube video ID: Y07j3hXAI-g

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The global market for precise smartphone location data operates behind a veil of anonymity that does not exist. Investigative journalists obtained a sample of 3.6 billion location points from a Florida‑based broker, revealing a sprawling pipeline that turns everyday app usage into a commodity bought by advertisers, intelligence agencies, militaries and criminal syndicates.

The Mechanics of Mass Tracking

Common smartphone apps—weather services, shopping platforms, games—collect granular location information. Apps such as WetterOnline were found to share precise data with more than 800 third‑party companies. Brokers aggregate these points, assign “anonymous” IDs, and list the data on marketplaces like Data Rate. The “anonymous” label is a misnomer: by mapping clusters of points to home and work addresses, individuals can be re‑identified in a process known as “confetti” re‑identification.

Security and Warfare Implications

Intelligence agencies use commercial location feeds to build “patterns of life,” pinpointing habits, routes and secure locations. In Ukraine, soldiers’ smartphones create digital footprints that enemy forces could exploit to locate command posts or time troop rotations. The Sinaloa Cartel reportedly leveraged location data to identify contacts of an FBI agent, demonstrating how criminal groups can weaponize the same information.

Targeted Persecution

Political dissidents are not immune. Egyptian journalist Basma Mostafa, living in exile in Berlin, was allegedly tracked by Egyptian agents through the data trade. In the United States, software such as LocateX enables the monitoring of individuals who visit abortion clinics, exposing women to legal and personal danger in states where the procedure is banned.

Industry and Regulatory Landscape

The advertising industry relies on movement data to craft “winning formulas,” often branding the practice as “privacy‑safe” or “consented.” These mental gymnastics allow firms to sidestep GDPR and other privacy statutes. Oversight is fragmented; companies constantly merge or rebrand, making enforcement in the U.S. ineffective and EU mechanisms limited. Experts suggest that only a total ban on personalized, location‑based advertising could halt the systemic abuse.

Takeaways

Journalists uncovered a sample of 3.6 billion location points that flow from everyday apps through brokers to a global marketplace.
The data can be re‑identified by matching “confetti” points to home and work addresses, debunking the myth of anonymity.
Intelligence agencies, militaries and criminal groups exploit the trade to build “patterns of life,” target command posts, and intimidate law‑enforcement contacts.
Current privacy laws such as GDPR are sidestepped by labeling data as “anonymous” or “consented,” leaving no effective oversight.
Experts argue that only a total ban on personalized, location‑based advertising could stop the systemic abuse of smartphone tracking.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does the smartphone location data pipeline work from apps to end users?

Apps collect precise location points and send them to data brokers, who assign anonymous IDs and list the information on marketplaces such as Data Rate. Buyers—including advertisers, intelligence agencies and criminals—purchase the data, creating a global trade pipeline that bypasses direct liability.

Why do existing regulations like GDPR fail to stop the location data trade?

Companies label the data as “anonymous” or claim user consent, exploiting loopholes that GDPR does not cover. The industry’s fragmented structure, frequent mergers and rebranding, and the lack of clear enforcement mechanisms allow the trade to continue despite formal privacy protections.

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Helpful resources related to this video

If you want to practice or explore the concepts discussed in the video, these commonly used tools may help.

Faraday Bag For Cell Phone Privacy Recommended

A Faraday bag blocks all incoming and outgoing signals, preventing a smartphone from transmitting location data to brokers or apps.

Amazon →

Privacy Screen Protector For Smartphone

A privacy screen limits the viewing angle of a display, preventing physical surveillance of sensitive information on the screen.

Amazon →

Books On Digital Privacy And Surveillance

Books on this topic provide deeper context on how data collection works and how individuals can better protect their digital footprint.

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Summarize another video

Full Transcript YouTube

This investigative story begins in
Berlin and will take us around the
world.
It starts with two journalists who can
barely believe what they've got in their
hands on.
You felt like you were working for a spy
agency. You had the most intimate
insights into people's lives.
The location data of unsuspecting cell
phone users.
We've all seen films about secret agents
where someone gets a GPS tracker shoved
in their pocket.
But the shocking reality is that we all
have such a tracking device in our
pockets, our smartphones.
Whoever has this data can construct
millions of movement behavior profiles
from dissidents.
>> I have no place to go cuz they can find
[music] me in any place. [clears throat]
To top-ranking officials and agents.
This is potentially a new form [music]
of asymmetric warfare.
All the way to Ukrainian soldiers at the
front.
Yes, yes. That was our evacuation point
here in the field.
This is about [music] everyone who uses
a smartphone. It's about the exact
movement profiles created by the data
harvested from our devices via popular
apps people use to check the weather,
shop, or play games.
>> [music]
>> It was really hard.
There was an especially awful moment
when I was truly scared that we'd be
completely encircled and not be able to
get out anymore.
It wasn't that I was afraid of dying.
It was the prospect of being taken
prisoner.
Without fear, you stood no chance there.
If you started to grow accustomed to
what happened there, that's when things
got really dangerous.
While in the midst of fighting house to
house,
I learned what war really means.
You feel like a hunted animal.
For days, I lived on a heap of garbage
down in a cellar.
It was the only safe place.
Dmytro and his comrades have experienced
the horrors of war in Kherson, in
Soledar, in foxholes in eastern Ukraine.
At the front, their smartphones were the
only connection to their normal lives
and their families back home.
Sure.
It lets you stay in contact with your
loved ones.
War is always a competition of wills and
in this respect, what you need above all
is to strengthen the morale of the
soldiers, their willingness to fight.
And I must say, cell phones are possibly
one of the most important elements in
the war in Ukraine to strengthen the
troops' morale, to help them retain a
connection with home, with their
families, with their former civilian
lives.
So, it would be very tough to do away
with mobiles entirely.
But how dangerous are they?
What happens when the location data of
soldiers like Dmytro can be easily
bought on the internet?
In late 2023, journalists Ingo Dachwitz
and Sebastian Meineck received a huge
data set. It was a free sample from a
broker in Florida.
It's hard to comprehend the magnitude.
His computer crashed when he first tried
to open the data set. That's how large
it was.
Each line in this table contains a
location with its latitude and
longitude.
We have 3.6 billion locations. So, you
could zoom into almost any corner of the
country and find phone location data
there.
After converting the data into a map,
the scale of the tracking became clear.
And the data was so exact
that you could see not just that someone
was in the building, but which corner of
the room the cell phone was in.
This location data came from millions of
people who had no clue to the extent
they were being tracked via their
phones. The journalists received data
sets from other brokers, too, with over
10 billion location points.
At first glance, the data looks to be
anonymous.
>> [music]
>> Instead of names, they contain IDs.
We learned very quickly that this data
is anything but anonymous. It starts
with two locations, the home and
workplace.
These two criteria alone identify us.
For example, could we uncover the
identity behind this ID, 86A5059B?
This person spent their nights here, so
it's likely their home.
These are clearly accumulated location
data, like confetti on a map. A phone
was traced to that building again and
again.
During the daytime, this individual
spends several hours at a school. These
pieces of information alone lead us
to her.
Emma, alias 86A5059B.
Emma is 18. Until recently, she rode the
bus to school every morning.
What she didn't know, all of her
movements were being tracked.
This here is the direct route to school
that my bus used to travel.
Now, it's [music]
It's unreal that you can retrace it so
precisely.
The data show Emma's route to school,
[music]
her whole daily routine.
When she was at the supermarket.
Yeah, but from there Yes, we drive there
regularly to go shopping, usually at
Lidl. As you can see.
And where she met up with friends.
Ah, this is
>> Oh, that's the McDonald's.
I was there a couple of times. You can
see that from the parking lot, too.
>> [music]
>> It's pretty unreal how many points there
are and how many moments data was
actually taken.
And that they have all of that just from
me, an ordinary person.
Emma has [music] lots of apps on her
smartphone and many of them collect
location data.
During installation, anyone who agrees
to the use of location data can wind up
in the data sets of brokers like the one
from Florida, like Emma has.
We can trace the exact route Emma takes
when she goes for a walk with her dog.
>> [music]
>> I usually take the same route because
it's relatively close.
Then I'm right on a country lane.
At the start, there are a couple of
houses, but if you keep going, there are
only fields and trees.
So, when I go for a walk, especially in
the evenings,
if some man had this data [music] and
decided to stalk me,
that would be scary.
You never know how far things will go.
It was clear from the start that what we
have here is not just a data privacy
issue, it's also a serious security
issue. This data can be misused in a
variety of ways.
What does that mean for people who
believe their lives are threatened?
Everywhere Basma Mostafa goes, she never
feels safe, even though she lives in
exile in Berlin.
Still in Berlin, after I'm escaping from
Egypt, I left my life behind me in
Egypt.
Basma Mostafa is an Egyptian journalist
who was arrested numerous times in her
homeland. She says she was also tortured
there. But [music] even in Berlin, she
says she is followed, harassed, and
threatened by Egyptian agents.
They come to me alone, directly, without
covering, and to let me know that the
high men in the Egyptian embassy know
about you everything.
She photographs the men who follow her,
like this man here.
She recalls one especially brazen
incident which happened here at the
Brandenburg Gate.
I stopped and took a look beside, so I
find a man.
I felt like I saw him before.
And I start to walk like this in a
circle.
And then I look to him.
I find him walking in a circle like me.
But it doesn't stop with simply watching
or tailing her. Basma Mostafa tells how
she was beaten at a demonstration
against the state visit of Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.
She reported the incident to the police.
Berlin's office of criminal
investigation later recommended she
change her place of residence.
And maybe they will beat me on the
street again or kidnap me from from
here. It's intense, but you know, I used
to
So
I used to this life.
And I'm still wondering really how they
know about my location, about the
street, about where where I am.
In Egypt, Basma Mostafa was a reporter
who went up against powerful people.
She experienced the end of the Mubarak
dictatorship, the Muslim Brotherhood's
brief rule, and the subsequent takeover
by the al-Sisi regime.
Mostafa reported critically on the
murder of an Italian student in Cairo,
on police violence, and Egyptian
politics until she was arrested in
October 2020.
In this time I was pregnant. They took
me to a woman prison to think about
yeah, I will stay here for at least 2
years and I will
deliver my baby in in the jail.
There is a knife on your neck.
Mostafa and her family managed to
[music] flee to Berlin via Lebanon and
Kenya.
In the German capital, she's trying to
build a new life for herself.
Yet time and again she wonders, how do
Egyptian agents know exactly where to
find her?
Could her own phone be betraying her?
Patterns of movement found in one data
set clearly belong to a person living in
her building. She's seeing them here for
the first time.
The cell phone location data leads from
her home to other addresses. Yeah, I
think I was in there in this address.
[music]
This is also the playground we play. I
take my kids there.
To a hospital.
>> [music]
>> I went to this hospital multi
a lot of times.
And her Kita, a daycare. We apply for
this Kita and we got accepted in the
Kita. Yeah, I think all of this um
address related to me.
How does it feel like?
>> [snorts]
>> Like hacked.
>> [music]
>> Basma Mostafa uses many apps [music]
that collect location data to check the
weather, shop, or read the news.
Could Egypt's intelligence agency be
buying such data sets to tail dissidents
like her?
The Egyptian embassy in Berlin wouldn't
answer this question, but intelligence
experts believe it's entirely plausible.
Quote unquote second-rate intelligence
agencies, ones that normally can't
compete with the big players from the
US, Russia, Britain, France, or China,
increasingly have access to data they
likely wouldn't have had just a few
years ago.
>> [music]
>> But why is data like this collected at
all?
Who wants to track the locations of
millions of people?
Welcome back from the coffee break. As
you can see, chairs have been set up for
the panel discussion. It's going to be
exciting.
>> [applause]
[music]
>> It all has to do with movement data.
It helps us understand who came into
contact with our advertising, and we can
use it to see who visited us personally.
Basically, the ones that saw the ad and
then actually came into the store
afterwards.
The ad executives at the D Drive Con
trade fair see great potential in this
location data, as it can tell
advertisers who was in which store,
when.
>> [music]
>> And then they can target those people
accordingly.
It's all about creativity. Combine that
smartly with data, and you've got the
absolute winning formula.
>> [applause and music]
>> Location data are extremely important,
especially for small and medium-sized
advertisers. A florist in Munich
wouldn't want to place ads for consumers
who live in Hamburg or Berlin. Location
data make it possible for even small
businesses to advertise their wares on
bigger platforms.
The German Association for the digital
economy says only imprecise data is
used, not exact locations accurate to
the meter.
That's not actually used in the ad
industry, as advertisers don't just aim
to reach one person that lives
somewhere. They want to reach groups of
people.
However, a glimpse at the [music]
websites of online ad agencies shows
that they openly admit to knowing
precisely where millions of people live,
work, and spend their free time.
And that anyone who wants to can get
their hands on this data quite easily,
[music]
as it's traded freely online.
We didn't acquire the data we received
through secret channels or by offering
heaps of money for it. Rather, these are
sample data sets that we got simply by
asking for them after exchanging a
couple of emails.
It all took place via company called
Data Rate that has its headquarters in
this Berlin high-rise. Trading location
data without users' consent is forbidden
in Germany, but acting as an agent for
foreign data brokers is permitted. And
that's precisely what Data Rate does.
It's how the journalists used its
platform to contact several data
brokers.
I really must say data brokers
practically throw these data sets at
potential buyers.
>> [music]
>> And there are plenty of potential
takers. The advertising industry wants
to reach the right customers [music] at
the right time. To do that, they require
huge amounts of data. GPS location data,
for instance. [music] That's collected
by smartphone apps.
>> [music]
>> This data shifted the entire model. It
was no longer about the publication they
were going to be reading or what have
you. The The promise of this data
was that well, you don't have to worry
about that. You're going to reach
whoever you want to reach, whoever's
interested in what you have, at the
right moment, in the right place, at the
right time.
Ariel Garcia was part of the system
which allowed data like this to get into
the hands of any intelligence agency,
any business, or even any criminal. She
worked in the ad industry in New York
for over a decade. Today she's an
activist endeavoring to expose the
industry's misdeeds.
So, the thing that I find interesting
about the industry is how nose blind it
is to the sensitivity of this data. It's
very easy to
have tunnel vision. Hey, we just want to
reach people that
might want our product. But
are you realizing that the byproduct of
that is that there's now this mass trade
in very sensitive consumer information
that can end up in the hands of
governments or
people that want to do bad things,
right? Um and
simply most people in the industry don't
think about that.
>> [music]
>> So, is the misuse of this data by
intelligence agencies or criminals a
sort of collateral damage? Not anything
the advertising industry expressly
[music] wants, but something they're
willing to accept all the same.
At any rate, there's growing evidence
that the exposure of people's data has
had harmful, even fatal consequences.
Take the case of a high-ranking Catholic
priest in the United States. Monsignor
Jeffrey Burrill was outed as a
homosexual against his will after a
reporter from Catholic online news
magazine The Pillar acquired his cell
phone's location data. Included was data
from Grindr, a dating app typically used
by gay men. Burrill was forced to
resign.
And in an even more dramatic case,
>> [music]
>> the Sinaloa Cartel, a powerful and
violent drug trafficking syndicate
feared throughout Mexico, analyzed the
cell phone location data of an FBI agent
to discover his local contacts. The
cartel then intimidated and in some
[music] cases killed those individuals.
It's possible that the cartel used a
data set similar to the one from the
data broker in Florida. It contained
data from millions of users, mainly from
Germany. Data that can be used to create
a profile of a person's movements.
Including one individual that triggered
shock waves that reverberated all the
way to Washington, D.C.
What we're seeing here is quite
politically sensitive. A person who
appears to work at a location for the
German intelligence service in Bad
Aibling. At any rate, they go there
every morning, And we ascertain that
they don't work at just any old place at
this station in Bad Aibling, but in a
building with a corrugated metal roof
called the tin can.
This building is well known as it's
where the NSA works together with
Germany's intelligence service, the BND.
And it's precisely this building that
the person went to.
Were they an employee of the US National
Security Agency
or a secret agent?
The location data allowed their
movements to be traced precisely.
There were visits to a gym, a beer
garden,
and a supermarket,
but also trips to US military facilities
in Germany.
Plus a flight to the Netherlands to
visit the US Embassy there.
These are all indications that we're
clearly on the trail of a high-ranking
functionary who certainly doesn't want
to be tracked so precisely.
Well, I think there are enormous
national security implications here. You
know, people get into the habit, they
carry their cell phone with them
everywhere, and it reveals every step
they take.
For decades, John Bolton navigated the
halls of power in Washington. He was an
important adviser to President George W.
Bush. To appoint John Bolton to serve as
America's ambassador
to the United Nations. And
congratulations.
Today, the former US ambassador to the
UN is one of President Trump's harshest
critics after having served as National
Security Advisor during Trump's first
term.
I want to
thank
Ambassador John Bolton. You are going to
do a fantastic job, and I appreciate
your time. Thank you. It's an honor to
be here. Thank you.
The National Security Advisor's
influential role in the US government
grants them access [music] to state
secrets and intelligence. For Bolton,
it's not just the tracking of a supposed
NSA agent that poses [music] a security
risk.
Our data set also includes detailed info
[music] on thousands of German and US
military personnel in Germany, their
places of residence,
>> [music]
>> and daily routines.
Often, if
criminal groups or intelligence services
or terrorist organizations
want to assassinate somebody, kidnap
them, they build what they call a a
pattern of life. They they look to see
what the potential target's habits
[music] are.
Do they leave their house for work at
the same time every day? Do they drive
on the same route? Do they take the same
escalator? And that helps to give them
[music] information to allow to plan
a kidnapping or an assassination, and
also how to get away quickly. So, this
this sort of information really
can be quite threatening.
>> [music]
>> From the American National Security
perspective, we don't want foreign
countries spying on our men and women in
military, spying on our national
security [music] assets. That's very
troubling, and I think it does pose
significant national [music] security
threats.
The revelations from German public
broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk and
digital rights blog Netzpolitik were a
hot topic in Washington in 2024.
>> [music]
>> Privacy advocates hoped the US
government would take action.
But then this happened.
Ladies and gentlemen,
please welcome President-elect Donald J.
Trump.
>> [music]
>> Thank you very much. Wow.
Look what happened. Is this crazy?
This will truly be the golden age of
America. That's what we have to have.
Instead of tightening regulations on
data trading, the new Trump
administration, with the help of Elon
Musk, threw the entire concept of data
protection out the window.
>> [laughter]
>> They're handing over our data and
private information to people who should
not not [music] have access to it.
I don't feel the Trump administration is
focused on this issue at all.
I don't think the Trump administration
is focused on protecting the American
people, and so I don't feel like they're
standing up for this in any way.
I think in America generally, there's
less concern about the threats to
privacy from personal data breaches than
[music] there is in Europe at the
moment. I don't I don't see any
significant interest, for example, in
Congress in the problem or in
legislation to fix the problem. [music]
That may change, but right now the focus
is elsewhere.
Many data brokers are based in the US,
and it doesn't appear that any real
effort is being made to regulate their
activities there.
What about in Germany?
At least it seems there's an attempt to
exert stricter controls over certain
apps.
And that has a lot to do with the data
set the two Netzpolitik journalists
received from the US broker.
Even they were shocked by the results of
their analysis.
I myself popped up in this data set. We
found data from me, my location data.
That means one of the apps on my phone
must have revealed my location, and
ultimately, it wound up with this data
broker.
Fairly quickly, we suspected one app
that kept turning up again and again
during the course of our research, my
weather app WetterOnline.
It was the only app for which Ingo
Dachwitz had [music] activated location
data. Though it was just one of tens of
thousands of apps in the data set from
the Florida-based broker.
Others included the German classified ad
as
>> [music]
>> Kleinanzeigen,
and its French equivalent Leboncoin,
flight tracking app [music]
Flightradar24,
plus countless gaming and dating apps.
[music]
Yet there were major differences. Some
apps only capture very general location
data, like the city district. [music]
Other locations are so precise they can
be attributed to the exact area within a
building.
Some apps share data with just a few
advertising partners, while others
exchange them with a myriad of companies
worldwide.
WetterOnline [music] stands out. The app
now shares user data with more than 800
companies, precisely [music]
showing where people live, work, and
spend their free time.
The oversight of WetterOnline lies with
North Rhine-Westphalia's State
Commissioner for Data Protection and
[music] Freedom of Information, Bettina
Gayk.
When we learned that location data
attributed to WetterOnline was being
traded by data brokers, we were
naturally alarmed.
In the spring of 2025, state authorities
decided to take action and turned up at
the offices of WetterOnline unannounced.
We sent a team of four people there.
The company had claimed that it didn't
pass on exact location data.
They had informed us that these location
were used solely for their own purposes,
namely to deliver their weather
services.
While there, the government
investigators gained access to
WetterOnline's computer system. They
spent hours searching for suspicious
data flows and found exactly what they
were [music] looking for.
In the systems, we actually found a
pipeline via which location data were
exchanged with Amazon.
And we were also told that there's
another link to Google services.
When asked, Amazon denied sharing
sensitive location data with others.
Google didn't respond.
And the authorities can't say for sure
if pipelines to other companies existed
as well.
And WetterOnline? The company now claims
to collect no location data for
advertising purposes, and it says it
stopped the flow of data.
Still, precise location data from
WetterOnline has already made its way
into the global data trade, including
our data broker in Florida.
Yes, this this data must come from
somewhere if it's being traded.
Basically, I see a big problem with data
being able to be traded so easily.
That location data becomes something to
be sold and aren't just used to offer a
service.
So, the operators of the apps aren't the
only ones who have smartphone users'
location data.
It's passed on to companies for targeted
marketing purposes.
And many of these companies are
intertwined with other companies,
forming a network that creates an
entirely new market.
>> [music]
>> Brokers who have nothing to do with the
apps or the ad business collect huge
amounts of highly sensitive location
data, and then sell it to anyone who's
willing to buy it.
At Dmytro's farm in Konotop, north of
Odessa, he and Svyat recall how
important their smartphones were to them
at the front.
Their phones were their sole connection
to their loved ones.
I tried to send a message to my mother,
my father, and my niece every morning.
I can show you the photos.
Most of these men are no longer alive.
Svyat, Dmytro, and their comrades
captured their experiences at the front
with their phones and shared them with
family and friends back home.
>> [music]
>> Your cell phone is very important
because it provides moral support.
You can feel the love of those back
home, your spouse.
It reminds you of what you're fighting
for at the front.
But could the phones that act as
soldiers' moral support also betray
them?
In the summer of 2023, I was with my
team at a brigade command post in the
Zaporizhzhia region and spoke with the
entire brigade staff there.
I remember the soldiers going in and out
of all the discussions.
They were all on their cell phones and
all forwarding any old messages.
Even at the time, I asked myself why
these cell phones were being used
everywhere so close to the front.
And what actually happened is that a few
days later, a Russian ballistic missile
slammed into the command post there.
Were the Russians able to identify their
target with the help of location data
coming from Ukrainian cell phones?
What can be done to prevent Vladimir
Putin's military intelligence from
buying data sets that show Ukrainian
troops movement profiles?
This branch of the ad industry is a
complete mess.
There's no overview on which companies
are getting in on this.
That's because they're constantly
changing their names or merging with
others.
And no one can tell me that the data
protection authorities have any kind of
meaningful access to them.
>> [music]
[music]
>> It's a total loss of control. A loss of
control on the part of the users who
aren't aware that their personal data is
being shared.
>> [music]
>> It's a loss of control on the part of
public government authorities.
And it's even a loss of control on the
part of this industry.
>> [music]
>> Martin Untersinger is an investigative
journalist at French newspaper Le Monde.
Together with digital rights
organization Netzpolitik and Bavarian
public broadcaster Bayerischer Rundfunk,
he analyzed the location data from
French apps in the data set.
What we discovered was that the mobile
phone advertising ecosystem facilitated
the mass collection and exploitation of
data.
There's an app in France that shares
huge amounts of ad data.
The app Le Bon Coin, installed by
millions of French people. We also had a
lot of gaming apps and one translation
app. We had all different kinds of
applications.
>> [music]
>> Along with all these companies,
Untersinger stumbled upon an unexpected
app provider.
>> [music]
>> When we started our investigation into
this data set, the first thing we asked
ourselves was, does our application, our
employer's app, figure in this data? And
yes, it did, specifically the Android
version of the app. The data set
contained around 4,500
advertising IDs.
Le Monde doesn't collect precise
location data from its users, so it's
different than the case of WetterOnline,
and the data is less sensitive.
For Martin Untersinger, it was both a
disturbing find and a stroke of luck.
Because if his own app appeared in the
data set, he and his team should be able
to find out how the data got there in
the first place.
>> [music]
>> Or so he thought.
Neither our technical teams, nor our
marketing teams, nor our legal team had
any idea how this data ended up in that
database.
We'd like to have gotten to the bottom
of it, but that proved impossible.
It's annoying, but it's also a perfect
illustration of how this industry is
impossible to decode or decipher. And
the actors are so numerous, so
sheltered, and constantly changing. I
have absolutely no idea what could be
done about it. I get the impression that
the situation is unsolvable.
And just how dramatic the consequences
of that can be for ordinary people is
something US journalist Byron Tau has
researched.
Well-connected in Washington's political
circles, he's written a book about the
risks of openly available data.
During his research, he discovered one
particularly chilling example, the
LocateX software offered by company
Babel Street.
I observed a demo from a company called
Atlas Privacy, and they had purchased
data from Babel Street. Babel Street
gets location information drawn from
common apps on cell phones, and [music]
Atlas did a pretty eye-opening
demonstration of the consequences of
that data being available for sale.
Tau recognized right away that this kind
of data can pose a real threat to
millions of Americans, or more
precisely, millions of American women.
That's because Babel Street's LocateX
[music] software makes it possible to
track which cell phone users visit
abortion clinics.
And we watched a phone drive across the
state line from
a state where
the procedure is completely outlawed.
And so that certainly looked like the
pattern of somebody, at the very least,
seeking out a medical opinion on
abortion.
Babel Street, whose software is already
being used by US authorities for law
enforcement purposes, declined to
comment.
After the US Supreme Court decision
overturned Roe v. Wade, which had
prevented abortion bans, many states
have now banned the procedure outright.
Doctors and pregnant women in many red
states now face harsh penalties for
terminating pregnancies.
Like in Texas.
Abortion access care in Texas is
terrible. The Republican-led legislature
have virtually shut down access for
women to have
freedom of reproductive care and
abortion access in the state. And so
women are forced to leave.
OB/GYNs are leaving, providers are
leaving, clinics are closing. Women are
not getting access to critical care that
they need.
Who's this?
Who's that?
Who's that?
Mommy. Mommy. And who's with Mommy?
Henry. Henry, that's right.
Today, Henry is 2 years old and alive.
He only barely avoided a darker fate.
When Lauren Miller was pregnant and went
for her first checkup, a surprise turned
up on the ultrasound.
And she comes in to give the results,
and she's like, yes. Um, so you do have
this severe form of morning sickness
called hyperemesis gravidarum. That's
more common when you have multiples. And
then she just paused, and my husband and
I just our jaws dropped, and she goes,
cuz you're having twins.
But the couple's joy was short-lived.
Just a few weeks later, it became clear
only one of the fetuses was viable.
The the results said trisomy 18, [music]
which we knew was not good. There was
fluid where half half of his brain
should have been was just fluid, and the
doctor was so frustrated. [music]
Yeah, he finally just
took off his gloves, threw them in the
trash, and said, this baby's not going
to make [music] it to birth. You need to
leave the state.
Her doctors told her that the only
chance to save her healthy baby was to
have a selective reduction, to abort
Henry's unviable twin.
But Lauren Miller lives in Dallas, in
the deeply conservative state of Texas.
[music]
>> [music]
[music]
>> So she stood no chance of having such a
procedure done in her home state.
Abortions are illegal here, even in
situations like hers. So she decided to
travel to Colorado for the abortion.
Lauren Miller and her husband told no
one of their plans.
I remember walking through the airport,
going through security, and I just kept
my head down the whole time. I wore this
very oversized black sweater because it
was a second pregnancy, it was a twin
pregnancy, so I was already showing. I
was already visibly pregnant, and I was
trying to hide the bump, kind of suck in
my stomach, because I was worried that
I was going to get pulled out of
security.
It's just this very bizarre situation.
We're not trying to go kill somebody or
hide a body.
We're trying to go save my life and that
of our viable twin.
Yeah, we were truly debating like do we
leave our cell phones at home?
>> [music]
>> As the case with Babel Street shows, in
the US, women in her situation have good
reason to be mistrustful of their
smartphones, especially when like Lauren
Miller, they use apps that collect
location data.
I have a variety of apps on my phone.
There's a lot of travel stuff, um, and a
lot of shopping.
Location services, 29 while using.
>> [music]
>> So, it's likely her data is available in
a data set somewhere.
And it's likely that the authorities, as
well as radical anti-abortion activists,
could track her journey to the abortion
clinic in Colorado.
Lauren Miller has decided to speak
openly about her case, but many women in
her situation
>> [music]
>> don't want anyone to learn they've had
an abortion.
>> [music]
>> And so, that's where this could be so
dangerous. It's such a nebulous concept
of somebody's got my data. It just
what is that? Who cares?
But, if you start understanding what
that means and how that can be dangerous
for you, especially in the context of
laws used to persecute you,
then that does become a concern. And
that's where that should be regulated.
We shouldn't be able to just track
anybody because that's a safety concern.
It's horrifying. You know, with such an
invasion of personal privacy, especially
if state governments and law enforcement
choose to spy on their own citizens,
when we have this kind of personal data
available in such a detailed way, in
such an unregulated way, it really
exposes people
for retribution, for retaliation, for
punitive acts, and it's unacceptable in
the United States of America. [music]
Could it be that US authorities are
using this data for other purposes
entirely?
According to testimony from the FBI
director in 2026, the FBI is purchasing
data from private brokers.
Location data could also be used to
track immigration, illegal or not, in
order to conduct mass arrests, as well
as deportations.
If US authorities refuse to take action
against the data brokers, could Europe
at least put an end to their business
model being employed?
The EU Commission could be the decisive
regulatory body. It's also in their own
interest, as the Commission's own staff
are affected.
In the data, we see a lot of people who
work at EU institutions, who then, for
instance, drive to the suburbs of
Brussels, or who work at the European
Parliament, even on safety and security
issues. People who work for the European
Commission.
Like one person who looks to have an
office in the Berlaymont building, the
EU Commission's headquarters in
Brussels.
The data shows exactly where this EU
staffer spends most of their time during
the day. In the evening, they take the
same route, past restaurants and office
towers, to a house in a wealthy suburb
of Brussels.
The name by the doorbell is of a
high-ranking official who works for
European Commission President Ursula von
der Leyen and is present at important
meetings.
Even in secret meetings, this person
could be a potential target.
A target for [music] espionage?
In response to our questions, the
European Commission wrote that they are
concerned about the trade in location
data of both EU citizens and Commission
employees.
They noted that all companies who are
active in the EU must abide by the
applicable laws, like the General Data
Protection Regulation.
This regulation very clearly states that
in Europe, [music] precise location data
can only be collected for a specific
purpose. That means the trade in
location data is actually prohibited.
So, how can it be that [music] this is
still taking place?
Market Insider Ariel Garcia knows the
tricks the industry [music] employs.
The industry
has a magical way of doing whatever
mental gymnastics are required to not
have to change anything about their
fundamental practices. Uh, so there is
no worry, right? Everyone just started
slapping words like privacy safe or
privacy compliant or consented or opted
in onto everything.
And everyone just kind of persisted
doing what they were doing before.
This total failure of government
regarding data protection endangers us
all and must end by enacting sweeping
legislation. The simplest and most
far-reaching step would be to say that
the online advertising ecosystem is so
broken that we're banning targeted
advertising. No firm should be allowed
to collect people's complete movement
data and create personality profiles
just to place ads.
After everything he's seen, Ingo
Dachwitz has a very clear opinion on the
matter, and it's one that is shared by
an increasing number of experts.
Is a ban on personalized advertising the
only way?
When asked, the European Commission
wouldn't comment on the issue, referring
instead to the prevailing laws.
The trade in this kind of sensitive data
endangers the privacy of people
worldwide, but can it endanger their
very lives, too?
It's clear.
The Russian army will do anything it can
to get us.
>> [music]
>> The data set includes several locations
in Ukraine, which lie very close to the
front.
For example, this one, near a fiercely
contested sector of the front.
Or here, in an industrial area just
outside Soledar.
The same building can be seen here in
pictures of the fighting, right at the
time Dmytro and his unit were there.
What's even worse, this data doesn't
just reveal the user's location, but
also that they were connected via
Starlink, the satellite internet network
used primarily by Ukrainian troops.
Starlink was used at this point, too.
Do these points really correspond to
Ukrainian positions?
Do the soldiers recognize their former
deployment sites at the front?
Right here by this red dot, that was our
headquarters.
And it was where all the soldiers had to
pass through who came in or out of
Soledar.
>> [music]
>> Yes, yes, that's the place.
We were picked up there quite a few
times.
It was our evacuation point, here by the
field.
I can use that to orientate myself.
Of course, it's bad.
I wish something like this weren't
possible.
But, all we can do is hope that we're
more in control of this technology than
the Russians.
It's dangerous.
Absolutely.
If I were a Russian commander and
suspected that a command post was
located there, I'd try to knock it off
as quickly as I could. Command posts are
essentially the brains of the unit and
coordinate attacks.
And not just at the front. The Russian
army could also use such data to suss
out command centers, weapons caches,
transport routes, and troop rotations.
When are troops rotated? That's actually
always the point in time when the front
line is the most vulnerable.
It's been an additional data point to
find out when the next rotation is to
take place, and then to launch an attack
while it's happening.
Location data has become a part of
modern warfare.
Smartphones are soldiers' connection to
their loved ones, yet also endanger
their lives and those of their comrades.
>> [music]
[music]
>> But, who profits from the trade in such
data? And where are these brokers
located?
They're far away from those dying on the
front lines in Ukraine.
>> [music]
>> A team from Bayerischer Rundfunk
traveled to a luxurious locale on the
west coast of Florida.
The man who supplied the data set that
launched this investigation [music]
lives here, in this house.
What does he have to say about the
dangers resulting from the sale of such
data? He even opens the door himself.
Would he agree to an interview?
Hello. We wrote you about an interview
on the subject of data trading.
Get off my property, now.
>> [music]
>> Not long afterwards, the data broker's
lawyer contacted us and denied all the
allegations.
He said that the data was anonymous and
acquired with the user's consent. And
that he'd never knowingly passed it on
to governments or intelligence agencies.
And what does Berlin-based company Data
Rate have to say? It was via its
platform that the data set from the
Florida broker reached Netzpolitik's
journalists.
The firm functions as a go-between,
bringing buyers and sellers of data
together.
Data Rate also declined to be
interviewed. In a written statement, the
firm asserts that it's only a
marketplace for data brokers and doesn't
offer any data itself.
It says it strongly condemns any form of
illegal data trading.
So, data trading continues to flourish.
Numerous data brokers, like the man from
Florida, are still active on Data Rate's
platform.
And Data Rate is just one of many such
marketplaces that operate worldwide.
It's a very difficult market to regulate
and um given how lucrative it is,
every user could simply switch off the
sharing of location data,
though that would mean many apps would
no longer function properly.
So, you really don't have a choice.
A smartphone's like a boat with hundreds
of holes in it with data leaking out all
over.
>> [music]
>> For dissidents like Bassma Mostafa,
for soldiers like Dmytro [music] Sviat,
and potentially for all smartphone
users, that means
anyone who wants to can spy on you,
track where you go and what you do.
Is it worth it?
The answer is no. The answer is no for
people. The answer is no for society.
The answer is no for democracy.
>> [music]
[music]
[music]
[music]
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DW Documentary

Apr 17, 2026

The Mechanics of Mass Tracking

Security and Warfare Implications

Targeted Persecution

Industry and Regulatory Landscape

Takeaways

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