Intersubjectivity Explained: From Husserl to Levinas

This article explores the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity, moving from traditional epistemological questions about the subject-object relationship to the more complex dynamic between subject and subject. It traces the influence of Hegel's master-slave dialectic and examines how various phenomenologists, particularly Husserl, Heidegger, Edith Stein, and Levinas, grappled with the problem of "the Other."

The Problem of Alienation and the Other

The discussion begins by revisiting the concept of alienation, a central theme in modernity. While Marx attributed alienation to structural economic conditions (e.g., a factory worker alienated from their labor), Simone de Beauvoir applied it to the instrumentalization of women by men, akin to a slave being used by a master. Both scenarios highlight a lack of mutual recognition, which Beauvoir argues is essential for liberation.

A constant in these discussions is the fundamental notion of "otherness." The "Other," often capitalized, signifies another subject whose existence is crucial to understanding our own.

Husserl's Phenomenology and its Limitations

The lecture then delves into phenomenology, particularly the work of Edmund Husserl, often referred to as the "first generation" of phenomenologists. Husserl's initial focus was on the subject-object relationship, emphasizing intentionality as the connection between consciousness and the world. However, his students felt something was missing: how to account for another subject, not just another object.

Husserl's phenomenology, while revolutionary, seemed to treat other subjects as mere variations of objects for one's own consciousness. His concept of the "transcendental ego" posited that everything else is an object for my consciousness. His solution to intersubjectivity, outlined in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, was an epistemological understanding based on analogy or "pairing." We imagine the other as a subject similar to ourselves, forming a "community of egos" or "monads."

This community of egos, for Husserl, constitutes a single, identical world. He used the analogy of a cube: no single person can see all six sides at once, but by combining different perspectives, we confirm the existence of the object and the shared world. This highlights that knowledge is intersubjective. Husserl argued that the idea of multiple, separate worlds is "pure absurdity," reinforcing the notion of a single, shared reality.

Despite this, Husserl's original phenomenology remained centered on the singular "I." He acknowledged that we have no direct access to another's primordial experience. The "other" remains, in some sense, an object for my consciousness. The only thing that necessarily exists, even after phenomenological reduction, is one's own "I" or transcendental ego. This leads to the concept of the "sphere of own-ness" ( Eigenheitssphäre ), where only what is given to "me" is considered.

Heidegger's "Being-with"

Husserl's students found this approach existentially thin. Martin Heidegger, a "second generation" phenomenologist, offered a different perspective. His concept of Dasein (being-there) emphasizes that we are always already "in the world" (in-der-Welt-sein). Crucially, this world is a "with-world" (Mitwelt), meaning we are always already "being-with" (Mitsein) others.

For Heidegger, intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity because we are never thrown into a world without other people. The only moment of pure disarticulation from this "being-with" is death, which Heidegger calls Jemeinigkeit (mine-ness), signifying that everyone dies alone.

Heidegger's focus then shifts to how we are in the world with others, introducing the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity. Inauthenticity arises when we fall into the das Man (the "they self" or conformist self), where we go along with what everyone else is doing, leading to generalized inauthenticity characterized by curiosity, gossip, and ambiguity.

Authenticity, for Heidegger, involves a profound loneliness, a confrontation with one's own mortality and the understanding that we are "being towards death." This realization brings a feeling of not being at home in the world (Unheimlichkeit). The question then becomes how one can be authentically in the world with others if authenticity implies such aloneness. Heidegger's Being and Time primarily focuses on the relationship between an individual being and being as such, rather than the relationship between two beings.

Edith Stein and the Embodied Self

Edith Stein, another student of Husserl, sought a "thicker understanding of intersubjectivity." Born into an Orthodox Jewish family in late 19th-century Breslau, she became an atheist in her youth, seeking truth through philosophy. She studied with Husserl in Göttingen, becoming part of a close-knit community of phenomenologists.

During World War I, Stein, a fervent German patriot, volunteered as a nurse, witnessing the gruesome realities of war and the suffering of the human body. This experience profoundly influenced her philosophical work.

Her dissertation, "On the Problem of Empathy" (Einfühlung – literally "feeling into"), argued that philosophical thought cannot ignore the body. She distinguished between the body as a Leib (living body, experienced from the inside) and a Körper (physical body, an object seen from the outside). We experience our own body as Leib, but other bodies as Körper. Empathy, for Stein, allows us to imagine that the Körper we see is also a Leib for another, experienced from the inside, through analogy and empathetic awareness.

Stein proposed two epistemological functions of empathy:

1. Increased Self-Knowledge: Empathy allows us to see ourselves as objects for others' consciousness. By imagining how others perceive us, we gain a fuller understanding of ourselves, moving beyond our own subjective viewpoint. This can even lead to others judging us more accurately than we judge ourselves.
2. Realism and Confirmation of the World: The shared experience of the world, confirmed through empathetic awareness (e.g., both seeing the same water bottle), validates the existence of a coherent, unified external reality. This asserts a modernist position that a holistic truth exists, connecting individuals.

Stein's work, though less widely known than Sartre's, laid the groundwork for many ideas that he would later popularize.

Sartre and the Gaze of the Other

Jean-Paul Sartre, influenced by these earlier phenomenologists, quickly recognized the moral and existential risks of a thin notion of the Other. He introduced the concept of "the gaze" (le regard) of the Other.

For Sartre, the moment we realize the Other is looking at us, we become aware of ourselves as an object for their consciousness. This realization is crucial because an object cannot be an object for another object; it can only be an object for another subject. Thus, the Other's gaze reveals their subjectivity.

This "radical decentralization" occurs when the Other appears in the world, shifting the entire universe and undermining one's own self-centered perspective. Sartre also emphasized that true self-knowledge requires recognition from the Other, echoing Hegel's master-slave dialectic. The famous "Barbie and Ken" analogy illustrates this: can Ken truly be Ken without Barbie's recognition?

Sartre's philosophy also touched upon a Kantian categorical imperative, suggesting that in deciding for oneself, one is also deciding for everyone. His play "No Exit" famously concludes with the line, "Hell is other people," highlighting the complex and often challenging nature of intersubjectivity.

Levinas and Radical Alterity

Emmanuel Levinas, a Lithuanian-born philosopher, made the most radical move in this philosophical lineage. He argued that "in the beginning is intersubjectivity." For Levinas, the grounding point of all ontology, epistemology, and ethics is the face-to-face relationship with the Other.

Levinas's concept of "alterity" emphasizes the radical otherness of the Other. He contrasts "infinity" with "totality." The Other is infinitely Other, beyond our grasp, and cannot be possessed or totalized within our own understanding. Desire, for Levinas, is a "metaphysical desire" for the absolutely Other, something that can never be fully attained.

The "stranger" disturbs our sense of being at home with ourselves, but also represents freedom, as they cannot be controlled or fully comprehended. The face-to-face encounter with the Other is an "ultimate situation" where we recognize their infinite otherness.

This encounter is fundamentally ethical. It involves a "calling into question of oneself," a critical attitude produced by the presence of the Other. For Levinas, the Other is always "calling to me," demanding responsibility. This summons to responsibility is a primordial, fundamental, and illuminating moment, akin to Husserl's reduction or Heidegger's confrontation with death.

In Levinasian philosophy, the Other is analogous to God, representing a secularized transcendence—a being on the other side that can never be fully reached or possessed, but always beckons, instilling a sense of responsibility and awakening us to ourselves.

Conclusion

The lecture concludes by noting that all these thinkers were deeply affected by war. Edith Stein, after World War I, converted to Catholicism and later entered a Carmelite convent after the Nazis came to power, ultimately perishing in the Holocaust. Her early philosophical work, however, significantly contributed to the understanding of intersubjectivity and the embodied self, preceding many of the ideas later popularized by Sartre.