Biological Warfare: Why It May Outweigh Nuclear Threats

Biological warfare presents an existential threat that, while often overshadowed by nuclear war in public discourse, is arguably more dangerous due to its insidious nature and ease of access. Unlike nuclear weapons, which are at the "worst, most destructive" end of the WMD spectrum, biological weapons are considered the most likely to occur and therefore the most dangerous.

The Insidious Nature of Biological Warfare

Biological weapons are invisible, silent, and, most terrifyingly, self-reproducing living munitions. This makes them incredibly sinister. While nuclear war evokes fears of instant death, biological warfare can lead to a prolonged, agonizing demise, making many wish for the instant end that nuclear weapons might offer.

Despite being illegal under international law, biological weapons exist, including genetically modified variants designed for extreme transmission, hypervirulence, and resistance to existing vaccines and countermeasures. The illegality often leads to a lack of public attention, but this doesn't diminish the threat.

The Origin of Genetic Engineering and Dual-Use Technology

The ability to engineer biological weapons stems from advancements in genetic engineering. The origin story of gene editing dates back to 1971 at Stanford University, where Nobel laureate Paul Berg figured out how to create "chimera pathogens" using recombinant DNA. This technology, which allows for the mixing and recombining of DNA, is the fundamental basis of gene editing.

Like all dual-use technologies, genetic engineering can be used for both healing and harm. The argument for its development often centers on preparing for potential threats: by working with dangerous pathogens and genetically modifying them, scientists aim to understand how to create medical countermeasures if such a pathogen is released. This creates a "chicken and the egg" or "catch-22" situation, where defense and offense are intertwined.

Gain of Function Research and COVID-19

"Gain of function" research, a term largely unknown before the COVID-19 pandemic, involves genetically modifying a pathogen to give it new functions, such as increased transmissibility or virulence. The stated purpose is to anticipate and prepare for potential biological weapons, but it also carries inherent risks.

COVID-19 highlighted two critical lessons: 1. Extreme unpreparedness: Despite billions spent annually in the US on pandemic preparedness, the world was severely ill-prepared. 2. Fractured public trust: The pandemic severely eroded public trust in science, public health officials, and politicians, creating a dangerous environment for future crises.

The COVID-19 pandemic, with its relatively low case fatality rate of 1%, could be seen as a "vaccine that went wrong"—a non-fatal dose of a future risk that exposed vulnerabilities. However, the erosion of trust means that if a more lethal pandemic were to emerge, public pushback and non-compliance would be immense.

Existential Risks and the Precipice Chart

A chart from Toby Ord's "The Precipice" illustrates the spectrum of existential risks. While natural risks like asteroids or supervolcanoes have low probabilities (e.g., 1 in 10,000 over 100 years), anthropogenic risks are significantly higher. Engineered pandemics, for instance, have a 1 in 30 chance in the next 100 years, and unaligned artificial intelligence has a 1 in 10 chance. The total anthropogenic risk over the next 100 years is estimated at 1 in 6.

Biological weapons pose a "near extinction-level event" risk, distinct from the "extinction-level event" of nuclear war. While nuclear war might allow for some recovery of civilization, a biological weapon capable of infecting every person and self-replicating could lead to permanent, unrecoverable collapse.

The Soviet Biological Weapons Program

The first large-scale weaponization of biological agents was undertaken by the Soviets during the Cold War. While the US also had a robust biological weapons program, President Nixon renounced it in 1969, leading to the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty, which declared biological weapons "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."

However, the Soviets secretly continued and expanded their program, stealing recombinant DNA technology from the US in the 1970s. This "Manhattan Project" for biological weapons was only revealed in the late 1980s by a defector, Vladimir Pasechnik. He informed British intelligence, who then verified his claims with the CIA. The Soviets were manufacturing tons of plague and smallpox weapons, designing delivery systems capable of surviving extreme heat.

Today, the US State Department officially states that Russia and North Korea have active biological weapons programs, and China and Iran are "questionable" (euphemism for likely having them). The US officially denies having an offensive biological weapons program, maintaining only a defensive one. However, many experts in the field believe that "gain of function" research is a euphemism for biological weapons engineering.

The Nuclear Deterrent and Lab Accidents

Nuclear weapons are considered a potential counter to biological weapons. There have been discussions within the US Department of Defense about presidential emergency directives to preemptively use nuclear weapons against known biological weapons facilities. This is because conventional explosives would merely atomize and disperse the biological agents, whereas a nuclear weapon's heat and speed would incinerate them.

However, the greater concern often lies not with deliberate attacks, but with accidental lab leaks. The paradox of biodefense is that the effort to defend against biological attacks leads to more labs being built, increasing the opportunity for catastrophic accidents.

After 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the biodefense industry in the US rapidly expanded. The number of Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) labs, which handle the most dangerous pathogens with no known cure (like Ebola and Marburg), increased from two to fifteen. BSL-3 labs, which handle pathogens like plague and hantavirus, now number over a thousand.

The Perfect Biological Weapon

The elements of a perfect biological weapon include:

1. Airborne transmissibility: This is paramount, as it allows for widespread infection without direct contact. COVID-19, initially believed not to be airborne by the WHO, demonstrated the critical importance of this factor.
2. High virulence/case fatality rate: While COVID-19 had a 1% fatality rate, engineered pathogens are often designed to approach 100%. Pneumonic plague, for example, has a 100% fatality rate if not treated with antibiotics within 24 hours.
3. Genetic modification to evade countermeasures: The Soviet super plague weapon was engineered to be resistant to antibiotics, effectively sending society back to a pre-antibiotic era.
4. Long incubation period and asymptomatic transmission: A long incubation period allows infected individuals to spread the pathogen unknowingly. Even more sinister, the Soviets reportedly engineered a "euphoria gene" into their plague weapon, making infected individuals feel good and thus more likely to socialize and spread the disease before symptoms appear.

A Nightmare Scenario: Day One

A plausible nightmare scenario begins with an explosion at a high-containment lab, such as Russia's Vector lab near Novosibirsk (which experienced an explosion in 2019, though without a known release). In this scenario, a genetically modified pneumonic plague is released.

The US, through satellite surveillance and other intelligence methods (like MASINT, which "sniffs" for chemical changes), would detect the explosion and subsequent attempts by the host nation to mitigate the release. Historically, host nations deny such incidents, as seen with the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak in the Soviet Union, which was initially attributed to contaminated meat.

The critical window for intervention is 12 to 36 hours. If the host nation is transparent and cooperative, containment might be possible. However, denial and cover-ups waste this precious time.

The Breakdown of Society: Day Two and Beyond

Once the pathogen is released, the intelligence community focuses on determining the extent of the outbreak and the host nation's response. The challenge is identifying the pathogen (virus vs. bacteria) and its characteristics, such as incubation period and dosage required for infection. For example, only 100-1000 plague particles are needed for infection, while the critical mass for SARS-CoV-2 is still unknown.

In a scenario where a highly transmissible and lethal pathogen is released, the breakdown of society can be rapid. A pre-med student doing pro bono work in a homeless encampment in Los Angeles, for example, could become a super-spreader, as homeless populations are often outside the syndromic surveillance systems designed to detect outbreaks.

The government's response shifts from population protection to safeguarding critical infrastructure. The 18,000-strong Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) response force would be deployed to protect essential services and facilities. However, war games often end at this point, as the ensuing anarchy and insurrection are too "painful to know what happens next."

Devolution and the Death of Government

The government, however, has a plan for what happens next: devolution. This is a continuity of government plan (COGCON) where a pre-selected group of government officials, equipped with "go bags," retreats to secret facilities to ensure the government's survival. This plan is not for the general population but for a tiny elite.

The strategic national stockpile, a classified reserve of medical countermeasures, would be deployed. However, if the public discovers the locations of these stockpiles (which can be deduced through various means, as demonstrated by AI's ability to identify them), they would be overrun by desperate citizens.

The presence of over 500 million guns among 340 million Americans, combined with a complete breakdown of trust, would lead to widespread anarchy and a fight for survival. As former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle stated, biological warfare would be "the death of government... the death of people... the death of everything you know," where "people doing inhuman things just survive."

The Black Death of the 14th century, which killed a third to half of Europe, offers a historical parallel, with contemporary accounts describing societal collapse, abandonment of children, and feral behavior. While COVID-19's 1% fatality rate prevented such widespread anarchy, a more lethal pathogen would undoubtedly trigger it.

The core issue is trust. Biological warfare uniquely attacks the trust necessary for civilization to exist. When citizens don't trust the government, and individuals can't trust each other due to the invisible threat of infection, society unravels.

The Future of Bioweapons and AI

The rapid pace of scientific and technological advancement, particularly in synthetic biology and AI, has outstripped conventional wisdom and even the Defense Department's ability to control it. Synthetic biology allows for the creation of entirely new pathogens that do not exist in nature.

The democratization of information and technology, while beneficial, also carries immense risks. As Nick Bostrom's "urn" analogy suggests, every technological advancement (drawing a ball from the urn) brings both progress and potential danger. The "black balls" represent technologies that could lead to game over.

The ability of AI to assist in creating biological weapons or identifying sensitive locations (like strategic national stockpiles) highlights the urgent need for informed public discourse and robust ethical frameworks. The government's past actions of clamping down on dissenting opinions, as seen during COVID-19, only further erodes public trust, making society more vulnerable to future biological threats.